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PENDENT-PARTY JURISDICTION
UNDER THE FTCA: FINLEY v.
UNITED STATES
Federal courts are courts of limited subject matter jurisdiction.'
See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2,
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3522,

cl.1; 13 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL
at 60 (2d ed. 1984). See also Insurance Corp. of Ireland v.
Compagnie Des Bauxites, 456 U.S. 694, 701-02 (1982) (federal courts are courts of limited
jurisdiction, and'therefore can decide only certain controversies). "Throughout the long
summer of 1787, the Framers of the Constitution, assembled at Philadelphia, hammered
the parochial prejudices of thirteen colonies into the rough framework of a union. There,
a fundamental tenet of American jurisprudence was forged: federal courts are courts of
limited jurisdiction." Verlinden B. V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 647 F.2d 320, 321 (2d
Cir. 1981), rev'd on other grounds, 461 U.S. 480 (1983); Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v.
Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 374 (1978) ("It is a fundamental precept that federal courts are
courts of limited jurisdiction."); McDermott v. Toyota Motor Sales Co., 487 F. Supp. 484,
486 (E.D. Tenn. 1980) (federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction with power to hear
only certain types of cases).
The federal courts' jurisdiction is derived largely from the Constitution and the Judiciary
Act of 1789. See U.S. CONST. art. III, §2, cl.1; Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § I Stat. 73.
In the Judiciary Act of 1789, Congress created inferior federal courts and granted them
some of the jurisdictional power contained in article III, as well as authorizing removal for
certain cases which would properly have been in the federal courts' jurisdiction had it been
brought there originally. See Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § I Stat. 73.
Federal courts will dismiss cases which exceed the parameters of proper subject matter
jurisdiction. See, e.g., Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149, 154 (1908) (dismissed for lack of proper subject matter jurisdiction).
Generally, the courts maintain that there is a presumption against proper federal subject
matter jurisdiction. See, e.g., Lehigh Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Kelly, 160 U.S. 327, 337 (1895)
(presumption at every stage of cause that it is without proper jurisdiction to be heard in
federal court); Grace v. American Cent. Ins. Co., 109 U.S. 278, 283 (1883) (as jurisprudence of federal court is limited, presumption is that cause is without its jurisdiction unless
it affirmatively appears otherwise); Naartex Consulting Corp. v. Watt, 722 F.2d 779, 792
(D.C. Cir.) ("Because federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, there is a presumption against the existence of diversity jurisdiction.") (citing 13 C. WRIGHT, supra, § 3522 at
62), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1210 (1983).
Plaintiffs must, therefore, clearly establish a jurisdictional basis. See, e.g., Grace, 109 U.S.
at 284 ("[I]t is declared not to be sufficient that jurisdiction may be inferred argumentatively from averments in the pleadings; . . . the averments should be positive." (citing
Browne v. Keene, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 112, 115 (1834))); Dracos v. Hellenic Lines Ltd., 705
F.2d 1392, 1395 (4th Cir. 1983) (plaintiffs must affirmatively plead jurisdictional bases),
cert. denied, 474 U.S. 945 (1985); Bonomo v. National Duckpin Bowling Congress Inc., 469
F. Supp. 467, 470 (D.C. Md. 1979) (it is well settled that plaintiff has burden of alleging
jurisdictional facts). But see, e.g., Hoefferle Truck Sales v. Divco-Wayne, 523 F.2d 543, 549
(7th Cir. 1975) (court declined to dismiss for lack of proper subject matter jurisdiction
when, although proper jurisdictional basis existed, it was not pleaded); Van Hoose v. Williams, 496 F. Supp. 947, 948 (E.D. Ky. 1980) ("[T]he court may sustain jurisdiction, even if
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Traditionally, the lower federal courts are empowered to exercise
subject matter jurisdiction over only those disputes which fall
within the ambit of both article III of the Constitution 2 and a congressional statute.3
it is defectively pled when a proper basis for jurisdiction appears upon review of the entire
complaint." (citing 5 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 1206 at 77 (1969))). In addition, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(1) provides that
"[a] pleading which sets forth a claim for relief ... shall contain (1) a short and plain
statement of the grounds upon which the court's jurisdiction depends, unless the court
already has jurisdiction and the claim needs no new grounds of jurisdiction to support it .
." FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(1).
The federal courts' policy requiring proper jurisdiction is so strong that many propositions of law flow from it; for instance, subject matter jurisdiction is not waivable. See, e.g.,
Mitchell v. Maurer, 293 U.S. 237, 244 (1954) (parties cannot remedy lack of federal subject jurisdiction by waiver). Nor can it be conferred by consent of the parties. See, e.g.,
Peoples Bank v. Calhoun, 102 U.S. 256, 260-61 (1880) ("mere consent of parties cannot
confer upon a court of United States the jurisdiction to hear and decide a case"). In addition, subject matter jurisdiction can be contested at any time during trial. See, e.g., Garroutte v. General Motors Corp., 179 F. Supp. 315, 317 (W.D. Ark. 1959) ("the courts ...
are under a duty to raise . . . question of lack of jurisdiction at any time such lack appears"). It may even be challenged for the first time on appeal. See, e.g., Dieffenbach v.
Attorney Gen. of Vt., 604 F.2d 187, 199 (2d Cir. 1979) (example of first-time challenge on
appeal). Federal courts also have jurisdiction to determine their own jurisdiction. See, e.g.,
Pacific Towboat & Salvage Co. v. I.C.C., 620 F.2d 727, 729 (9th Cir. 1980) ("jurisdiction
of the court under Article Ill [of U.S. Constitution] is always open to inquiry upon the
court's own motion .... "); Mitchell, 293 U.S. at 244 (federal court must satisfy itself as to
jurisdiction). See generally Baker, Toward a Relaxed View of Federal Ancillary and Pendent
Jurisdiction, 33 U. Prrr. L. REV. 759 (1972).
' U.S. CONST. art. Ill, § 1 provides in relevant part: "The judicial power of the United
States, shall be vested in one Supreme Court, and in such inferior courts as the Congress

may from time to time establish." Id. Article III also provides that:
The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under the
Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be
made, under their authority; - to all cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls; - to all cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction; - to Controversies to which the United States shall be a Party; - to Controversies between
two or more States; - between a State and Citizens of another State; - between
Citizens of different States; - between Citizens of the same State claiming Lands
under Grants of different States, and between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and
foreign states, Citizens or Subjects.
Id. at § 2, cl. 1,
' See Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1, 16-18 (1976) ("Before it can be concluded that
such jurisdiction exists, a federal court must satisfy itself not only that article III permits it,
but that Congress in the statutes conferring jurisdiction has not expressly or by implication
negated its existence."); Kline v. Burke Constr. Co., 260 U.S. 226, 234 (1922) ("Congress
may confer jurisdiction upon such courts .... "); Cary v. Curtis, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 236, 245
(1845) ("[C]ourts . . . must look to the statute as the warrant for their authority."); see
generally Hart, The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: An Exercise in
Dialectic, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1362, 1362-63 (1953) (series of quotations on congressional authorization of judicial power).
It is clear, therefore, that the lower federal courts will need both constitutional and con-

Finley v. United States
In the absence of a congressional statute, the judicially created
doctrine of pendent jurisdiction, 4 under United Mine Workers of
gressional power to have jurisdiction over a dispute. See The Mayor v. Cooper, 73 U.S. (6
Wall.) 247, 252 (1868).
As regards all courts of the United States inferior to this tribunal, two things are
necessary to create jurisdiction, whether original or appellate. The Constitution
must have given to the court the capacity to take it and an act of Congress must have
supplied it. Their concurrence is necessary to vest it.
Id. See also Owen, 437 U.S. at 372 ("[UJurisdiction of the federal courts is limited not only
by the provisions of [article] III of the Constitution, but also by acts of Congress." (citing
Palmore v. United States, 411 U.S. 389 (1973))); Cary, 44 U.S. (3 How.) at 245 ("[T]he
judicial power of the United States, although it has its origin in the Constitution, is . . .
dependent ... upon the action of Congress ... [for] investing [it] with jurisdiction ....
);
Ex rel. McColgafh v. Bruce, 129 F.2d 421, 423 (9th Cir.) (Constitution endows federal
courts with capacity to take jurisdiction, but it takes an act of Congress to confer it), cert.
denied, 317 U.S. 678 (1942); Dumansky v. United States, 486 F. Supp. 1078, 1082 (D.N.J.
1980) (authority must be found in congressional grants of jurisdiction and article III of
Constitution); Sinchak v. Parente, 262 F. Supp. 79, 82 (W.D. Pa. 1966) ("Federal courts
are empowered to hear only such cases as are within the judicial power of the United
States and have been entrusted by Congress."); Garroutte, 179 F. Supp. at 317 (federal
district courts lack general jurisdiction; therefore, jurisdiction is valid only when prescribed
by Constitution and Congress); Baker, supra note 1, at 759-61 (jurisdiction limited by the
Constitution and Congress); Note, FederalPendent PartyJurisdictionand United Mine Workers
v. Gibbs - Federal Question and Diversity Cases, 62 VA. L. REV. 194, 196 (1976) ("[w]ithin the
outer limits of article III of the Constitution, the jurisdiction of the federal district courts is
theoretically subject to the will of Congress.
... ). See generally H. FRIENDLY, FEDERAL
JURISDICTION: A GENERAL VIEW (1973).
' See, e.g., Dumansky, 486 F. Supp. at 1083 (doctrine of pendent jurisdiction evolved in
federal courts); Maltais v. United States, 439 F. Supp. 540, 546 (N.D.N.Y. 1977) (doctrine
developed by judiciary).
The judicial development of pendent jurisdiction can be traced back to Osborne v.
United States Bank, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 823 (1824), in which Chief Justice Marshall
recognized that
when a question to which the judicial power of the Union is extended by the Constitution, forms an ingredient of original cause, it is in the power of Congress to give
the Circuit Courts jurisdiction of that cause, although other questions of fact or law
may be involved in it.
Id. See also Hagans v. Levine, 415 U.S. 528, 554 (1974) (jurisdiction of federal courts extends not only to federal issues but to non-federal issues essential to settlement of federal
claim). The doctrine was expanded in Siler v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 213 U.S.
175 (1909) in which the Court indicated that a lower federal court "had the right to decide
all the questions in [a] case, even though it decided the Federal questions adversely to the
party raising them, or even if it ... decided the case on local or state questions only." Id. at
191. The doctrine was further defined in Hurn v. Ousler, 289 U.S. 238 (1933), in which
the Court required that the federal claim must be substantial and sufficiently related to the
state claim in order to confer jurisdiction. Id. at 245-46. Pendent jurisdiction was refined
and fully articulated in the landmark case of United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715,
729 (1966). Gibbs is now synonymous with pendent jurisdiction. See, e.g., Finley v. United
States, 109 S. Ct. 2003, 2006 (1989) (discussion of Gibbs as seminal case for pendent-party
jurisdiction). See infra note 7 and accompanying text (description of Gibbs analysis).
See generally 13 C. WRIGHT, supra note 1, at § 3567; Shakman, The New PendentJurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 20 STAN. L. REV. 262 (1968); Note, The Evolution and Scope of the
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America v. Gibbs,5 has been successfully invoked to confer the requisite jurisdiction upon the federal court.' Pendent jurisdiction,
under the traditional Gibbs analysis,' enables a plaintiff to append
Doctrine of Pendent Jurisdiction in the Federal Courts, 62 COLUM. L. REV. 1018 (1962).
6 383 U.S. 715 (1966). The Gibbs case resulted from the rivalry between the United
Mine Workers and the Southern Labor Union over representation of workers in the southern Appalachian coal mines. Id. at 718. After the Tennessee Consolidated Coal Company
laid off one hundred miners belonging to the Union's Local 5881 when it closed one of its
mines, the members forcibly prevented the opening of another mine with which respondent Paul Gibbs had a contract as its mining superintendent and hauling contractor. Id. at
718-19. Gibbs lost his job as well as other trucking contracts and mine leases he held in
nearby areas. Id. at 720. Claiming that these effects were the result of a concealed union
plan against him, he brought an action in the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Tennessee against the Local's International Chapter. Id. Jurisdiction was premised on allegations of secondary boycotts under § 303 of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, 61 Stat. 158, and, under the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction, a state law
claim of "an unlawful conspiracy ... and an unlawful . . . boycott aimed at him . . . to
maliciously, wantonly, and wilfully interfere with his contract of employment and with his
contract of haulage." Id. Gibbs was awarded compensatory and punitive damages against
the United Mine Workers of America, and the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
affirmed. Id. The Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed, holding that while pendent jurisdiction existed even though the only recovery allowed plaintiff was on the state
claim, reversal was required for failure to meet the special proof requirement imposed by
the Norris-LaGuardia Act. Id. at 729, 735.
' See, e.g., Herald Co. v. McNeal, 553 F.2d 1125, 1131 (8th Cir. 1977) (pendent jurisdiction found to exist where claim of violation of state constitution joined with claim of violation of United States Constitution); Verville v. International Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers, 520 F.2d 615, 618 (6th Cir. 1975) (state claim by union members under
contract was appended to federal claim against union under Railway Labor Act); Phillips v.
Trello, 502 F.2d 1000, 1005 (3d Cir. 1974) (pendent jurisdiction exercised over state law
defamation claim, joined with illegal harassment claims against civil servants under 42
U.S.C. § 1983). But see, e.g., Umdenstock v. American Mortgage & Inv. Co., 495 F.2d 589,
592-93 (10th Cir. 1974) (pendent jurisdiction over state claims for breach of trust and
unjust enrichment refused where joined with federal antitrust claims); Hales v. Winn-Dixie
Stores, Inc., 500 F.2d 836, 848 (4th Cir. 1974) (no pendent jurisdiction where claims seeking payments under profit-sharing action joined with claim under Welfare and Pension
Plans Disclosure Act); Deen v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 608 F. Supp. 783, 785
(W.D.N.C. 1985) (no pendent jurisdiction over state claims of breach of contract and infliction of emotional distress where joined with claims under Age Discrimination in Employment Act).
' Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 725-26. The analysis is two-part: both jurisdictional power and discretionary concerns must be considered. Id. See generally Comment, UMW v. Gibbs and
Pendent PartyJurisdiction, 81 HARV. L. REV. 657 (1968) (background to Gibbs analysis).
Under the first part of the Gibbs analysis, three requirements must be satisfied to insure
that jurisdictional power exists. See Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 725. First, "[tihe federal claim must
have substance sufficient to confer subject matter jurisdiction on the court." Id. In addition, "[t]he state and federal claims must derive from a common nucleus of operative fact."
Id. Finally, the state and federal claims must be such that they would ordinarily be tried in
one judicial proceeding. Id. If these criteria are met, the federal courts are empowered to
hear the whole dispute. Id. See also Baker, supra note 1, at 763-65 (discussion of jurisdictional power under Gibbs); Note, Unravelling the 'Pendent-Party'Controversy: A Revisionist Approach to Pendent and Ancillary Jurisdiction, 64 B.U.L. REV. 895, 900-05 (1985) (same).

Finley v. United States
a jurisdictionally insufficient state law claim onto a claim which is
jurisdictionally sufficient.' Historically, pendent jurisdiction has
extended only to the addition of claims brought by a plaintiff
against the original defendant. 9 Recently, federal courts have extended the doctrine to allow a plaintiff with a federal question
claim against one defendant to assert a closely related state claim
against another defendant, 0 provided that the criteria comprising
Under the second part of the Gibbs analysis, "[the federal courts'] power [to confer pendent jurisdiction] need not be exercised in every case in which it is found to exist." Gibbs,
383 U.S. at 726. "It . . .is a doctrine of discretion, not of plaintiff's right." Id. Factors to
consider include judicial economy, convenience, fairness to litigants, comity with state
tribunals, predominance of state issues, and possible jury confusion in treating divergent
legal theories of relief. Id. at 726-27. A court, after considering these factors, will determine whether or not it should exercise its discretion and confer pendent jurisdiction. Id.
See also Baker, supra note 1, at 765-67 (discussion of discretion part of Gibbs analysis);
Schenkier, Ensuring Access to Federal Courts; A Revised Rationale for PendentJurisdiction, 75
Nw. U.L. REv. 245, 289-305 (1980) (extensive discussion of each factor in discretion part of
Gibbs analysis); Note, supra at 905-07 (same).
The majority of cases ruling on pendent jurisdiction employ the two-part Gibbs analysis.
See, e.g., Simms v. Western Steel Co., 551 F.2d 811, 819-20 (10th Cir.) (illustrates use of
Gibbs analysis in context of federal patent claim and state breach of licensing claim), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 858 (1977).
8 See Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 728-29; Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1976) (comparing
pendent jurisdiction to pendent-party jurisdiction). See also Dumansky v. United States, 486
F. Supp. 1078, 1083 (D.N.J. 1980) (articulating what pendent jurisdiction accomplishes).
See generally Note, supra note 7.
' See Ayala v. United States, 550 F.2d 1196, 1198 (9th Cir.), cert. granted, 434 U.S. 814
(1977), cert. dismissed, 435 U.S. 982 (1978). "In the simple 'pendent claim' context, a plaintiff seeks to have a federal court hear a state claim .. .with a federal question action .. .
between the same parties." Id. "The instant case presents the 'pendent party' variant which
. . . requires for its resolution the joinder of an ancillary party." Id. In its classic form,
pendent jurisdiction allows federal jurisdiction to be exercised over the state and federal
claims, which are between the same parties. Id. If the state claim requires the court to
exercise jurisdiction over a defendant other than the defendant to the federal claim - this
is known as pendent-party jurisdiction. Id. See also Florida E. Coast Ry. v. United States,
519 F.2d 1184, 1194 (5th Cir. 1975). "This case is admittedly somewhat different from
Gibbs in that the federal and state claims are not asserted against the same party." Id. Hipp
v. United States, 313 F. Supp. 1152, 1154 (E.D.N.Y. 1970) (case differed from Gibbs in that
it involved one cause of action against two persons, rather than two causes of action against
one person).
10 See North Dakota v. Merchants Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 634 F.2d 368, 370-74 (8th
Cir. 1980) (jurisdiction permitted over claim against Comptroller of Currency granted
under section 30 of the National Bank Act while pendent-party jurisdiction was exercised
over state common law claims against banks for unfair competition); Federal Deposit Ins.
Co. v. Otero, 598 F.2d 627, 632 (1st Cir. 1979) ("[olther courts have concluded, as we do,
that the Supreme Court's cautious treatment of pendent jurisdiction does not preclude
pendent party jurisdiction ....");Florida E. Coast Ry., 519 F.2d at 1195 ("This circuit,
however, like several others, has held that the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction may be
invoked to join a new party ....");Almenares v. Wyman, 453 F.2d 1075, 1083 (2d Cir.
1971) ("doctrine of pendent jurisdiction is sufficiently broad to support a claim within the
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the Gibbs test is met. 1 Nevertheless, in Finley v. United States,'2 an
action brought under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA),' 8 the
United States Supreme Court refused to allow a plaintiff to join
state law claims against a city and a utility company with a federal
claim against the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), even after conceding that all claims derived from a "common nucleus of
' 4
operative fact.'
limits of Gibbs against a person not a party to the primary, jurisdiction-granting claim"),
cert. denied, 405 U.S. 944 (1972); Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. Craton, 405 F.2d 41,
48 (5th Cir. 1968) ("strong and practical policies" support exercise of pendent-party jurisdiction). See also Note, supra note 3, at 236 (rationale of Gibbs and policies underlying federal question and diversity jurisdiction justify recognition of pendent-party jurisdiction with
certain limitations); Comment, Pendent and Ancillary Jurisdiction: Toward a Synthesis of Two
Doctrines, 22 UCLA L. REV. 1263, 1287 (1975) (favors exercise of pendent-party jurisdiction). "The continued expansion of pendent jurisdiction and the uniform use of the Gibbs
power-discretion test should be encouraged." Id. at 1263. "[I]ndemnification from third
parties is both logical and practical." Id. See generally Comment, Federal Pendent Subject
Matter Jurisdiction - The Doctrine of United Mine Workers v. Gibbs Extended To Persons Not
Party to the Jurisdiction Conferring Claim, 73 COLUM. L. REV. 153 (1973) [hereinafter Comment, Federal Pendent]. But see, e.g., Munoz v. Small Business Admin., 644 F.2d 1361, 136566 (9th Cir. 1981) (denying pendent-party jurisdiction when used to "circumvent the complete diversity requirement ....
"); Crumpacker v. Andrus, 516 F. Supp. 286, 290 (N.D.
Ind. 1981) (while jurisdiction over claims brought under 28 U.S.C. section 2409a(a) was
assumed to exist, pendent-party jurisdiction over claim against the federal government was
denied as improper "waiver" of governmental immunity). See also Comment, The Extension
of PendentJurisdiction to Parties not in the Jurisdiction-ConferringSuit, 20 Loy. L, REV. 176,
198 (1974) [hereinafter Comment, The Extension of Pendent Jurisdiction] ("the more flexible
pendent jurisdiction becomes, the greater the deterioration of limited jurisdiction and federal-state comity"); Note, supra note 7, at 946-47 (pendent-party jurisdiction threatens fundamental principles of limited jurisdiction and federalism).
"' Brown v. United States, 838 F.2d 1157, 1159 n.5 (11 th Cir. 1985) ("district court has
the power to assert pendent party jurisdiction . . . provided that the constitutional test is
satisfied, i.e., the pendent party claim and the principal claim arise from a common nucleus
of operative fact"). Courts have not hesitated to conclude that the Gibbs test is part of what
governs whether or not pendent-party jurisdiction may be invoked. See Dumansky v.
United States, 486 F. Supp. 1078, 1084 (D.N.J. 1980). "We conclude that Gibbs provides
the correct measure for determining whether this court has the power to entertain pendent party claims." Id. (citing Ortiz v. United States, 595 F.2d 65, 71 (1st Cir. 1979)).
12 109 S. Ct. 2003 (1989).
" 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1982). The section provides in pertinent part:
[TIhe district courts . . . shall have exclusive jurisdiction of civil actions on claims
against the United States, for money damages ....
for injury or loss of property, or
personal injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any
employee of the Government while acting within the scope of his office or employment, under circumstances where the United States, if a private person, would be
liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred.
Id.
14 See Finley v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 2003, 2007-08 (1989).

Finley v. United States
In Finley, petitioner's husband and two of her children were
killed when a twin-engine plane, on which they were passengers,
struck electric transmission lines during its approach to a San Diego, California airfield."5
Petitioner brought a tort action in state court against the San
17
Diego Gas and Electric Company,1" and the city of San Diego.
She later discovered that the FAA was in fact the party responsible for the runway lights and filed an action against the United
States in the United States District Court for the Southern District of California 8 under the FTCA, 28 U.S.C. section 1346(b).19
Almost a year later, petitioner sought to amend the federal
complaint to add her state law claims against the city and the utility, for which there was no independent basis of federal jurisdiction.2" The district court, finding that the federal and state claims
arose from a common nucleus of operative facts, 21 granted the petitioner's motion 22 and asserted pendent jurisdiction under
Gibbs.23 The court reasoned that judicial economy and efficiency
would best be served by hearing the federal claim and state claims
at the same time. 2 ' The district court certified an interlocutory
appeal2 5 to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. The Ninth Circuit refused to recognize pendent-party jurisdiction and summarily reversed.26
Id. at 2005. No one survived the resulting crash. Id.
Id. Petitioner claimed that the utility had negligently positioned and inadequately illuminated the electric transmission lines. Id.
Id. Finley claimed that the city negligently maintained the airport's runway lights rendering them inoperative the night of the crash. Id.
18 Id. at 2005. Petitioner alleged negligence in the FAA's operation and maintenance of
the runway lights, and performance of air traffic control functions. Id.
11 Finley, 109 S. Ct. 2003, 2005 (1989).
18
1I

Id.
21 Id.
20

22 Petition for Writ of Certiorari at A-5, Finley v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 2003 (1989)
(No. 87-1973). The Opinion and Order of the United States District Court for the Southern District of California, dated April 16, 1987, is unreported and is instead found in Appendix A to the Petition for Writ of Certiorari at A-8 to A-9, Finley v. United States, 109
S. Ct. 2003 (1989) (No. 87-1973).
IS Finley, 109 S. Ct. at 2005.
,4 Id. The Court concluded that the aims underlying the Gibbs doctrine, namely, judicial
economy, efficiency and convenience to litigants were applicable here since all claims arose
from a "common nucleus of operative facts." Id.
25 Id.

"6 Petition for Writ of Certiorari at A-I to A-2, Finley v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 2003
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The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari " ' to resolve a split among the circuits as to whether pendent-party jurisdiction could be asserted over additional parties under the
FTCA.2 8 In a 5-4 decision, the Court affirmed the Ninth Circuit's
decision, holding that a grant of jurisdiction over claims involving
particular parties does not itself confer jurisdiction over additional
claims by or against different parties.2 9 The Court had previously
acknowledged that it may sometimes be necessary to forgo the efficiency and convenience of a consolidated action in favor of separate actions in state and federal courts. 30 The majority in Finley
concluded that the FTCA permitted no other result."1 While it
was conceded that Congress could change this, the Court stated
that until then, the Gibbs approach would not be extended to the
pendent-party field.3
Writing for the Court, Justice Scalia first examined the existing
case law regarding the exercise of pendent jurisdiction. 3 He
stated that the application of pendent jurisdiction under Gibbs to
pendent-party claims had already been explicitly rejected. 4 The
significant legal difference between pendent jurisdiction and pendent-party jurisdiction is that pendent-party jurisdiction permits
the addition of a new and distinct party which "would run counter
(1989) (No. 87-1973). The basis for the Court's reversal was an earlier categorical rejection
of pendent-party jurisdiction under the FTCA. Id.
"' Finley v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 52 (1988).
28 Finley, 109 S. Ct. at 2005.
29 Id. at 2010. The Court added that all of its cases have consistently espoused this interpretive rule. d. See infra notes 77-80 (discussion of congressional intent behind FTCA in
light of case law).
"0Finley, 109 S. Ct. at 2010.
Judicial economy, convenience and fairness to litigants were the weighty aims upon
which the Gibbs Court justified the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction. United Mine Workers
v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1965).
Courts which have approved of pendent-party jurisdiction justify the extension of the
doctrine on those same aims. Maltais v. United States, 439 F. Supp. 540, 548 (N.D.N.Y.
1977) (barring use of pendent-party jurisdiction, especially under the FTCA would "defeat
the common sense policy of pendent jurisdiction . . . ") (quoting Rosado v. Wyman, 397
U.S. 397, 405 (1970)). Nevertheless, the Finley Court concluded that such interests are not
sufficient to justify the extension of the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction when such extension runs contrary to the requisite congressional authorization. See Finley, 109 S. Ct. at
2008.
"2 Finley, 109 S. Ct. at 2010.
22 See id.
22 Id. at 2006. See also infra notes 75-78 and accompanying text (discussion of case law).
, See Finley, 109 S. Ct. at 2007.

Finley v. United States
to the well-established principle that federal courts are courts of
limited jurisdiction marked out by Congress." 5 Consistent with
this practice, the Court maintained that the FTCA, which grants
to the federal courts exclusive jurisdiction over claims brought
against the United States, does not 'authorize courts to have jurisdiction over any defendants other than the United States. 6 Moreover, the Court recognized that in cases like Finley, where a party
has both a state and federal claim, and the federal claim can only
be brought in federal court, the party might have to bring separate suits."7 However, the majority found it inconsequential that
the petitioner could sue only in federal rather than state court
under the FTCA."8
Justice Scalia refuted several contentions presented by the petitioner and the dissenters. 9 The majority rejected Justice Stevens'
claim that the power to exercise pendent-party jurisdiction exists
under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 14(a)4" and 20(a)" by cit" Finley, 109 S. Ct. at 2007 (quoting Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1, 15 (1976)). It was
also emphasized that the resolution of a pendent-party claim requires careful attention to
the relevant statutory language. See Aldinger, 427 U.S. at 17.
" Finley, 109 S. Ct. at 2009.
The FTCA . . .does not say 'civil actions on claims that include requested relief
against the United States,' nor 'civil actions in which there is a claim against the
United States' - formulations one might expect if the presence of a claim against the
United States constituted merely a minimum jurisdictional requirement, rather than
a definition of the permissible scope of FTCA actions.
Id. at 2008.
The Court bolstered its contention by drawing an analogy. See Owen Equip. & Erection
Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 373-74 (1978). "The statutory provision 'between ... citizens
of different States' has been held to mean citizens of different states and no one else."
Finley, 109 S. Ct. at 2008. This led the majority to conclude that here too "against the
United States" meant no other defendant could be included under the statute. Finley, 109
S. Ct. at 2008. See also Healy v. Ratta, 292 U.S. 263, 270 (1934) ("due regard for the
rightful independence of state governments .. .requires that [federal courts] scrupulously
confine their own jurisdiction to the precise limits which the statute has defined").
" Id. at 2010. The FTCA imparts exclusive jurisdiction to the federal courts, therefore,
the petitioner cannot relegate the federal claim to state court to be heard along with the
state claim. Id. at 2008.
" Finley, 109 S. Ct. at 2008. "Our holding that parties to related claims cannot necessarily be sued there means that the efficiency and convenience of a consolidated action will
sometimes have to be foregone in favor of separate actions in state and federal courts." Id.
at 2010. The FTCA permits the federal government to be sued only in federal court. See
28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(a)(2), 1491(a)(1) (1982).
s'See Finley, 109 S. Ct. at 2006-09.
40 FED. R. Civ. P. 14(a). The rule, entitled "Third Party Practice," provides in pertinent
part:
When Defendant May Bring in Third Party. At any time after commencement of
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ing Federal Rule 82 which provides that the Federal Rules "shall
not be construed to extend . . . the jurisdiction of the United
States district courts.""' Furthermore, the Court rejected the petitioners contention that an affirmative grant of pendent-party jurisdiction was suggested by changes made to the jurisdictional grant
of the FTCA as part of the comprehensive 1948 revision of the
3
judicial code.4
the action a defending party, as a third-party plaintiff, may cause a summons and
complaint to be served upon a person not a party to the action who is or may be
liable to the third-party plaintiff for all or part of the plaintiff's claim against the
third-party plaintiff.
Id.
11 FED. R. Civ. P. 20(a). The rule, entitled "Permissive Joinder of Parties," provides in
relevant part:
All persons ... may be joined in one action as defendants if there is asserted against
them jointly, severally, or in the alternative, any right to relief in respect of or arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences
and if any question of law or fact common to all defendants will arise in the action.
Id.
"' FED. R. Civ. P. 82. The rule provides in pertinent part that "these rules shall not be
construed to extend or limit the jurisdiction of the United States district courts." Id.
Justice Stevens argued that the district court had statutory power to decide the case and
that it was undisputed that this power would not be defeated by the joinder of two private
defendants. Finley, 109 S. Ct. at 2013 (Stevens, J., dissenting). He supported his argument
by references to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 14(a) and 20(a). Id.
The majority refuted this argument by averring that the statutory power to decide the
case was not defeated by the joinder of a private party for purposes of a claim over which
the district court had no independent jurisdiction, but that the statutory power to decide a
case including such a claim did not exist. Id. at 2009 n.6. The reason that it did not exist
was that the FTCA provided jurisdiction only for claims against the United States and
Rules 14(a) and 20(a) did not alter this since Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 82 prevents
the Federal Rules from being construed so as to extend the jurisdiction of the United
States district courts. See id.
" Finley, 109 S. Ct. at 2009. The original FTCA conferred upon the district courts "exclusive jurisdiction to hear, determine and render judgment on any claim against the
United States." 28 U.S.C. § 931 (1946). In the 1948 revision this was changed to "exclusive jurisdiction of civil actions on claims against the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)
(1952). The petitioner urged that this broadened the scope of the statute so as to permit
the assertion of jurisdiction over any civil action that included a claim against the United
States. 109 S. Ct. at 2009.
The majority refuted the argument as a matter of statutory construction. Id. "[lit will
not be inferred that Congress, in revising and consolidating the laws, intended to change
their effect, unless such intention is clearly expressed." Id. (quoting Anderson v. Pacific
Coast S.S. Co., 225 U.S. 187, 199 (1912)). Also, in referring in particular to the 1948
recodification of the Judicial Code, the Court reiterated its earlier stance that "no changes
in law or policy are to be presumed from changes of language in the revision unless an
intent to make such changes is clearly expressed." Fourco Glass Co. v. Transmirra Prods.
Corp., 353 U.S. 222, 227 (1957). The majority found neither a clear expression nor even a
suggestion of a substantive change resulting from this rewording. Finley, 109 S. Ct. at
2009. In addition, the Court found that the rewording would be a perfectly understanda-

Finley v. United States
In his dissent, Justice Blackmun maintained that Congress did
not intend to exclude private defendants under the FTCA." He
argued that the majority considered the wrong question under
Aldinger v. Howard' and that the proper issue was whether "Congress has demonstrated an intent to exempt 'the party as to whom
jurisdiction pendent to the principal claim' is asserted from being
haled into federal court."4' 6 Finally, Justice Blackmun stated that
Aldinger was not an obstacle to allowing the exercise of pendentparty jurisdiction as the majority claimed since Aldinger asserted,
in dicta,'4 7 that the exercise of pendent-party jurisdiction may be
proper in certain circumstances.""
In a separate dissent, Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Brennan
and Marshall, asserted that neither the constitutional nor the statutory power to decide the case would be defeated by the joinder
of two private defendants. 9 Justice Stevens noted that federal
judges throughout the circuits, including some of the wisest and
ble way to achieve another objective - to revise the Judicial Code in such a way as to
make its terminology consistent with the recently adopted Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Id. "There shall be one form of action to be known as 'civil action.' " FED. R. Civ. P.
2.
Furthermore, the Court pointed out that to rely upon the 1948 recodification is to ignore the fact that the concept of pendent-party jurisdiction was not considered "remotely
viable until Gibbs liberalized the concept of pendent-claim jurisdiction - nearly twenty
years later." Finley, 109 S. Ct. at 2010.
" Finley, 109 S. Ct. at 2011. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
427 U.S. 1 (1976).
" Id. at 2010 (Blackmun, J.,. dissenting) (quoting Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1, 16
(1976) (emphasis in original)). Justice Blackmun asserted that the Court in Aldinger found
the requisite intent for substantive limitation - municipalities, at that time, were excluded
from the relevant jurisdictional statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Id. at 2011 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting).
" See Aldinger, 427 U.S. at 18. See infra note 101 (specific language quoted).
48 See Finley, 109 S. Ct. at 2011 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Factors to consider in this
determination include alignment of parties and claims and whether the grant of jurisdiction to the district court is exclusive. Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting). The sensible result, in a
case where the jurisdiction granted is exclusive, is that pendent-party jurisdiction should be
allowed. Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
49 Id. at 2013 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens maintained that since the dispute
between all the parties derived from a common nucleus of operative facts, there is ample
basis for the controversy to be considered a single "case" and for the petitioner in turn to
assert additional claims against the nonfederal defendants, as authorized by Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 20(a) Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting). "Under the [Federal Rules of Civil Procedure], the impulse is toward entertaining the broadest possible scope of action consistent
with fairness to the parties; joinder of claims, parties and remedies is strongly encouraged."
United Mine Workers of America v. Gibbs., 383 U.S. 715, 724 (1966), quoted with approval
in Finley, 109 S. Ct. at 2014 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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most learned judges in the area of federal jurisdiction, had recognized that the reasoning behind the Gibbs decision should be applied to cases involving pendent-party jurisdiction."0 The dissent
further reasoned that the majority's interpretation of the FTCA
was inadequate because it construed the absence of an affirmative
congressional grant of jurisdiction as meaning implicit rejection of
jurisdictional authority."1 Justice Stevens maintained that this approach was inconsistent with an obligation to discern congressional intent."2 The fact that no congressional disapproval existed,
either express or implied,"3 coupled with the powerful circum50Id. at 2015. (Stevens J., dissenting). "Immediately after Gibbs was decided, federal
judges . . . recognized that its reasoning applied to cases in which it was necessary to add an
additional party." Id. For example, Judge Friendly, "universally recognized, not only as
one of our wisest judges, but also as one with special learning and expertise in matters of
federal jurisdiction[,]" wrote three separate opinions espousing this reasoning. Id. In Almenares v. Wyman, 453 F.2d 1075, 1083 (2d Cir. 1971) (statutory claim against State Commissioner of Social Services found to be pendent to constitutional claim against City Commissioner of Social Services), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 944 (1972), Judge Friendly concluded
that "the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction is sufficiently broad to support a claim within the
limits of Gibbs against a person not a party to the primary, jurisdiction-granting claim." Id.
at 1083. Then, in Leather's Best, Inc. v. S.S. Mormaclynx, 451 F.2d 800 (2d Cir. 1971) (court
found both power and discretion to exercise pendent-party jurisdiction under the Carriage
of Goods By Sea Act over a related state claim), Judge Friendly observed that "the common sense considerations underlying [Justice Brennan's language in Gibbs] seem broad
enough" to encompass pendent-party jurisdiction. d. at 809 (quoting Astor-Honor, Inc. v.
Grosset & Dunlop, Inc., 441 F.2d 627, 629 (2d Cir. 1971)). Finally, in Astor-Honor, (pendent-party jurisdiction exercised over unfair competition claim in relation to copyright infringement claim), Judge Friendly correctly described the limited scope of the holding in
Aldinger: "The Court explicitly limited its conclusion to the issue of pendent-party jurisdiction with respect to the claims brought under 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) and 42 U.S.C. § 1983."
Id. Judge Friendly then concluded that under the circumstances before him, a claim
brought under an exclusive jurisdictional-granting statute, "was as powerful for the exercise of pendent-party jurisdiction as can be imagined." Id. Cf. Aldinger v. Howard, 427
U.S. 1, 18 (1975) The Court stated, in pertinent part:
When the grant of jurisdiction to a federal court is exclusive, for example, as in the
prosecution of tort claims against the United States under 28 U.S.C.A. § 1246, the
argument of judicial economy and convenience can be coupled with the additional
argument that only in federal court may all of the claims be tried together.
Id. See Comment, Federal Pendent, supra note 10, at 160-69 (agreement with and discussion
of three cases and their effect on application of Gibbs analysis). But see Comment, The Extension of Pendent, supra note 10, at 190-98 (discussion of how three cases were erroneously
decided and ramifications thereof).
81 Finley, 109 S. Ct. at 2019 (Stevens, J.; dissenting).
5'Id. at 2020 (Stevens, J., dissenting). "[T]he Court's approach is neither clear nor faithful to our judicial obligation to discern congressional intent." Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
63Id. at 2017 n.23 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The dissenters buttressed their argument by
quoting United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 340 U.S. 543, 547 (1951). ("[W]e find no congressional disapproval of the exercise of such pendent party jurisdiction in the FTCA. The
waiver of immunity .. .was made in 'sweeping language.' ") Justice Stevens then listed a
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stance that Congress has vested the federal district courts with exclusive jurisdiction under the FTCA, led Justice Stevens to conclude that the exercise of pendent-party jurisdiction was
justified. 54 He concluded his dissent by discussing two other flaws
present in the majority's opinion: a failure to distinguish between
diversity and federal question cases,5 5 and an implicit reliance on a
narrow view of the waiver of sovereign immunity in the FTCA."
This Comment will first examine the trend in the lower federal
courts concerning the extension of Gibbs fo the pendent-party issue, and suggest that the Finley Court espoused too narrow a holding by declining to confer pendent-party jurisdiction under the
FTCA. It will then discuss how the Supreme Court has customarily analyzed the permissibility of pendent-party jurisdiction and
how the district and circuit courts have concluded when pendentparty jurisdiction under the FTCA may properly be invoked. The
Comment will then show how the Court's decision in Finley will
serve not only to further confuse lower federal courts as to the
proper analysis to employ when deciding the issue of pendentline of cases in which it was held that the exercise of pendent party jurisdiction under the
FTCA was allowed because Congress did not intend otherwise. Finley, 109 S. Ct. at 2017
n.23 (Stevens, J., dissenting). See infra notes 70-74 and accompanying text (discussion of
various courts' interpretation of pendent-party jurisdiction under FTCA).
5 Finley, 109 S. Ct. at 2017 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The Aldinger Court suggested that
pendent-party jurisdiction would be available under the FTCA because the grant of jurisdiction is vested exclusively in the federal courts. Aldinger, 427 U.S. at 18. Cf. Weinberger
v. Kendrick, 698 F.2d 61, 76-7 (2d Cir. 1982) (exclusivity of federal jurisdiction under
Securities Exchange Act was major factor in court's decision to exercise pendent-party jurisdiction), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 818 (1983).
11 See Finley, 109 S. Ct. at 2021 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The majority's reliance on diversity cases caused them to overlook the purpose behind the principle of pendent jurisdiction. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting). Forcing a federal plaintiff to litigate his case in both federal and state courts impairs the ability of the federal court to grant full relief and "imparts
Aldinger, 427 U.S. at
a fundamental bias against the utilization of the federal forum ....
36 (citation omitted). The Court was incorrect in assuming that since Congress did not
sanction the exercise of pendent-party jurisdiction in the diversity context, it did not intend
to permit its exercise with respect to claims exclusively within the federal jurisdiction. See
Finley, 109 S. Ct. at 2021 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
" See Finley, 109 S. Ct. at 2022 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The majority relied on Sherwood v. United States, 312 U.S. 584 (1941) in asserting that the jurisdiction conferred by
the Tucker Act was based on the history of the Court of Claims and that the sovereign's
consent to suit must be strictly construed. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting). However, since the
reenactment of the FTCA, the waiver of sovereign immunity under the Tucker Act is no
longer strictly construed. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting). "When authority is given, it is liberally construed." Id. at 2023 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting United States v. Shaw, 309
U.S. 501 (1939)).
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party jurisdiction but also to undermine part of the congressional
intent behind the FTCA. It will further discuss the arguments
present in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for the exercise of
pendent-party jurisdiction. Finally, it will demonstrate how the
Finley decision has eroded the weighty concepts of judicial economy, convenience, and fairness to litigants as promulgated in the
landmark decision of United Mine Workers v. Gibbs.

I. PRE-Finley TREND
In United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, the Supreme Court, after employing a two-part analysis,57 decided that federal courts may exercise jurisdiction over jurisdictionally insufficient state law claims,
if they are properly appended to jurisdictionally sufficient federal
claims. 58 It is submitted that the trend in the lower federal courts
prior to the Finley decision was to favor an extension of Gibbs to
pendent-party jurisdiction. The overwhelming number of courts
doing so strongly suggests that the majority in Finley, by denying
pendent-party jurisdiction, has set forth too narrow a holding.5 9
Immediately after Gibbs was decided, various lower federal courts
recognized that its reasoning was applicable to cases in which it
was necessary to add an additional party to a pendent federal
claim in order to grant complete relief.6" Judge Friendly, sitting
on the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit and
a renowned expert in federal jurisdiction, was one of the first
judges to consider pendent-party jurisdiction in each of three separate opinions.6 1 He maintained that Justice Brennan's language
in Gibbs and the common sense considerations underlying it
See supra note 7 (description of two-part test).
" United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725-27 (1966).
" See Finley, 109 S. Ct. at 2011 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Moor v. County of Alameda,
411 U.S. 693, 713 n.29 (1973) (citing court of appeals decisions recognizing pendent-party
jurisdiction); Comment, The Concept of Law-Tied Pendent Jurisdiction:Gibbs and Aldinger Reconsidered, 87 YALE UJ. 627, 634 (1978) (pre-Aldinger cases in majority of lower federal
courts permitted exercise of pendent-party jurisdiction). See also Note, Pendent-PartyJurisdiction: The Demise of a Doctrine ?, 27 DRAKE L. REV. 361, 368 (1977) (many lower federal
courts exercise pendent-party jurisdiction).
0 Finley, 109 S. Ct. at 2015. See infra note 70 and accompanying text (discussion of
courts recognizing necessity of adding parties).
"1 See supra note 50 and accompanying text (discussion of Judge Friendly's opinions).
57
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seemed broad enough to cover pendent-party situations as well. 62
Moreover, the trend toward extending Gibbs has become more
pronounced in cases arising under the FTCA.6 3 Only the Ninth
Circuit has consistently rejected the invocation of pendent-party
jurisdiction under Gibbs."" Hence, it is submitted that the analysis
employed by the lower federal courts, which have asserted pendent-party jurisdiction, is correct. It is further submitted that the
Supreme Court erred in ignoring this analysis and in making such
a restrictive ruling in Finley.
II.
A.

LEGISLATIVE INTENT AND PENDENT-PARTY JURISDICTION

Pendent-PartyJurisdiction Under Congressional Statutes

In examining pendent-party jurisdiction, both the Supreme
Court and lower federal courts have initially assessed whether
power to assert the jurisdiction is within article III of the Constitution.6 In order to do this, a court looks to the posture in which
6 Astor-Honor, Inc. v. Grosset & Dunlop, 441 F.2d 627, 629 (2d Cir. 1971), quoted in
Finley, 109 S. Ct. at 2015 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Further, in Astor-Honor, Judge Friendly distinguished all cases denying pendent-party jurisdiction as either predating Gibbs, and therefore "suspect as authority," or as relying on a
theory of lack of power, which was undermined by Gibbs. See Astor-Honor, 441 F.2d at 62930 (Judge Friendly distinguished cases, ultimately finding pendent-party jurisdiction); Note,
supra note 7, at 918 (Gibbs analysis).
"' See infra note 70 (cases brought under FTCA which upheld pendent-party jurisdiction). See also Note, supra note 3, at 205 (trend of lower federal court decisions since Gibbs
found to have such power); Comment, Pendent and Ancillary Jurisdiction:Towards a Synthesis
of Two Doctrines, supra note 10, at 1279 (majority of courts have followed this trend).
0
See, e.g., Idaho ex rel. Trombley v. United States Dep't of the Army, Corps of Eng'rs,
666 F.2d 444, 446 (9th Cir. 1982) (Ohio not permitted to have its state claim "ride the
coattails" of its FTCA claim against United States into federal court).
"[1]n order for a claim against other parties to be joined properly with a claim against
the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act, an independent ground of jurisdiction must exist, and that the theory of pendent jurisdiction is not sufficient." Williams v.
United States, 405 F.2d 951, 954 (9th Cir. 1969); accord Ayala v. United States, 550 F.2d
1196, 1198 (9th Cir.)(independent ground of jurisdiction required), cert. granted, 434 U.S.
814 (1977), cert. dismissed, 435 U.S. 982 (1978). See also Comment, Pendent-PartyJurisdiction - Forcing the Subtle and Complex Issue, 11 Loy. L.A.L. REV. 659, 663-70 (1977) (discussion of Ninth Circuit's position on pendent-party jurisdiction); Comment, Pendent and Ancillary Jurisdiction: Towards a Synthesis of Two Doctrines, supra note 10, at 1279 (Ninth
Circuit, in relying on pre-Gibbs precedent, refuses to recognize pendent-party jurisdiction
under any circumstances).
" See Dumansky v. United States, 486 F. Supp. 1078, 1086 (D.N.J. 1980). "Gibbs dictates
a two tiered approach to determining whether a court may exercise pendent party jurisdiction. The first tier looks to [article] III limitations .... .. Id. See also Owen Equip. &
Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 372 (1978) (constitutional power is only first hurdle
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the state claim is asserted in relation to the federal claim.8 6 If it is
found that the requisite constitutional power exists, the court then
determines if the specific statute under which the federal claim is
brought has either "expressly or by implication negated" the exercise of pendent-party jurisdiction.67 If, upon careful attention to
the statutory language, the court finds that Congress expressly negated the exercise of pendent-party jurisdiction, then the court's
ability to confer it is preempted.6 8 However, should the statute be
silent, the court has an obligation to look at congressional intent
to determine if pendent-party jurisdiction has been impliedly
negated.6 9
that must be overcome in determining whether federal court has power to exercise pendent-party jurisdiction); Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1, 18 (1975) (before it can be concluded that pendent-party jurisdiction exists, federal court must satisfy itself that article III
permits it).
" United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1965). See supra note 7 (test set
forth in Gibbs must be met for article III jurisdiction to exist); see also Owen, 437 U.S. at

373.
" Aldinger, 427 U.S. at 18. Before it can be concluded that pendent-party jurisdiction
may be exercised "a federal court must satisfy itself not only that Art. Ill permits it, but
that Congress in the statutes conferring jurisdiction has not expressly or by implication
negated its existence." Id. See Owen, 437 U.S. at 373 (court determined diversity statute
impliedly negated pendent-party jurisdiction); Bourdeaux v. Puckett, 611 F.2d 1028, 103031 (5th Cir. 1980) (court determined Motor Vehicle Act did not expressly or impliedly
negate pendent-party jurisdiction); Ortiz v. United States, 595 F.2d 65, 72-73 (1st Cir.
1979) (court determined that Congress has expressly prohibited or impliedly negated pendent-party jurisdiction); Dumansky, 486 F. Supp. at 1089 (same).
" Aldinger, 427 U.S. at 17-18 (1975). A fair reading of the statute, under which AIdinger's claim was brought, indicated to the Court that Congress impliedly negated the exercise of pendent-party jurisdiction. Id. See Owen, 437 U.S. at 373-74. In the diversity jurisdiction statute, under which Owen was brought, Congress expressly mandated that there
can be no jurisdiction unless there is complete diversity between parties. Id. In the Owen
situation, where pendent-party jurisdiction would produce incomplete diversity, the Court
denied the existence of jurisdiction because Congress had expressly negated the results its
exercise would produce. Id.
"' See Finley v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 2003, 2020 (1989) (Stevens, J., dissenting) "The
Court today adopts a sharply different approach. Without even so much as acknowledging
our statement in Aldinger that before a federal court may exercise pendent-party jurisdiction it must satisfy itself that Congress has not 'expressly or by implication negated its
existence .
"I...'
Id. (quoting Aldinger, 427 U.S. at 18). See, e.g., Owen, 437 U.S. at 373-74
(federal diversity statute impliedly negates pendent-party jurisdiction by providing that diversity is "between ... citizens of different states"); Aldinger, 427 U.S. at 19 (Civil Rights
Act impliedly negates pendent-party jurisdiction by indicating parties be persons, not
counties).

Finley v. United States
B.

Pendent-PartyJurisdiction Under the FTCA

Although the United States Supreme Court has never before
addressed pendent-party jurisdiction under the FTCA,7 ° most circuit courts and district courts have already confronted the issue
and have held that pendent-party jurisdiction is viable under the
FTCA. The FTCA is silent as to whether the United States must
be the only defendant. Instead, the statute provides that the
United States will be liable "in the same manner and extent'as a
private individual in the same circumstance." 1 Courts have,
therefore, interpreted the FTCA broadly to grant exclusive jurisdiction to the federal courts over tort claims against the United
States as well as to allow other defendants in the action.7 Even
70 Finley, 109 S. Ct. at 2005. The Court granted certiorari to resolve a split among the
circuits on whether the FTCA permits an assertion of pendent-party jurisdiction. Id. See
Dumansky, 486 F. Supp. at 1084. "As to the question whether a court has power to entertain pendent-party claims in an action brought under the FTCA, the circuit courts . . .
have divided." Id. Barring the Third Circuit, most other circuits have confronted the question. Id.
Most courts of appeals deciding the issue of whether to exercise pendent-party jurisdiction under the FTCA against a non-federal defendant have had no difficulty in extending
Gibbs to cover the situation. Id. See also Brown v. United States, 838 F.2d 1157, 1159 n.5
(11 th Cir. 1988) (pendent-party jurisdiction may be exercised under FTCA); Lykins v.
Pointer, Inc., 725 F.2d 645, 649 (11th Cir. 1984) (court concluded district court had
power to assert pendent-party jurisdiction under FTCA); Stewart v. United States, 716
F.2d 755, 758 (10th Cir. 1982) (pendent-party jurisdiction may be exercised over non-federal defendants under FTCA), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1018 (1984); Dick Meyers Towing
Serv., Inc. v. United States, 577 F.2d 1023, 1024 n.1 (5th Cir. 1978) (exercise of pendentparty jurisdiction under FTCA held to be proper); Center Glass & Trim Co. v. United
States, 637 F. Supp. 209, 212 (S.D. W. Va. 1986) (court, although using discretionary
power to deny pendent-party jurisdiction, cited with approval those cases which have upheld pendent-party jurisdiction under FTCA); Maltais v. United States, 439 F. Supp 540,
548-49 (N.D.N.Y. 1977) (pendent-party jurisdiction allowable under FTCA). But see Idaho
ex rel. Trombley v. United States Dep't of the Army, Corps of Eng'rs, 666 F.2d 444, 446
(9th Cir. 1981). The Ninth Circuit consistently rejects any exercise of pendent-party jurisdiction. Id. See also Munoz v. Small Business Admin., 644 F.2d 1361, 1365 (9th Cir. 1981)
(court denies exercise of pendent-party jurisdiction); Hymer v. Chai, 407 F.2d 136, 137
(9th Cir. 1969) (sweeping rejection of pendent-party jurisdiction).
7
28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1949). See, e.g., Lykins v. Pointer, Inc., 725 F.2d 645, 648 (11th
Cir. 1984). No indicia of restrictive legislative intent toward pendent-party jurisdiction exists under the FTCA. Id. "[Tihe statute has not spawned any restrictive judicial interpretations that could have been tacitly embraced by Congress." Id.
" See United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 340 U.S. 543, 547 (1951) ("The Federal Tort
Claims Act waives the Government's immunity from suit in sweeping language" and allows
defendants other than United States in action for contribution), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1018
(1984), accord Stewart v. United States, 716 F.2d 755, 758 (10th Cir. 1982) (court found
no congressional disapproval for the exercise of pendent-party jurisdiction under the
FTCA since "the waiver of immunity [FTCA] . . . was made in 'sweeping language.'"
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the Ninth Circuit, which has consistently denied the exercise of
pendent-party jurisdiction because it reads article III as disallowing it, admits that those circuits that interpret article III as permitting pendent-party jurisdiction must pay careful attention to
statutory language and the intent behind it."'
III. Finley

IN LIGHT OF

Owen

AND

Aldinger

In Finley, the Supreme Court relied primarily on its prior decisions in Owen Equipment & Erection Co. v. Kroger 4 and Aldinger v.
Howard to decide that pendent-party jurisdiction was not proper
under the FTCA 5 In Owen, the Court denied the exercise of
pendent-party jurisdiction in a diversity action because to do otherwise would have contradicted the congressional mandate of absolute and complete diversity. 6 In Aldinger, the Court refused to
(quoting Yellow Cab Co., 340 U.S. at 547)). See also Wood v. Standard Prods. Co. Inc., 456
F. Supp. 1098, 1103 (E.D. Va. 1978) (court noted that statutory language must be considered in light of exclusive federal jurisdiction over FTCA claims; therefore, pendent-party
jurisdiction should be invoked to hear all claims together).
" Idaho ex rel. Trombley, 666 F.2d at 446. "[T]his court has consistently rejected the
concept of pendent party jurisdiction." Id. See Ayala v. United States, 550 F.2d 1196, 1200
n.8 (9th Cir.) (Ninth Circuit concedes both constitutional power and lack of congressional
disinclination are prerequisites to exercise of pendent-party jurisdiction, but, the Ninth
Circuits' difficulty rests in its interpretation of art. III as not encompassing pendent-party
jurisdiction), cert. granted, 434 U.S. 814 (1977), cert. dismissed, 435 U.S. 982 (1978). See also
Munoz, 644 F.2d at 1365-66 (9th Cir. 1981) (pendent party jurisdiction not available to
circumvent diversity); Hymer, 407 F.2d at 137 (sweeping rejection of pendent-party
jurisdiction).
,' 437 U.S. 365 (1978).
75 Finley v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 2003, 2007-08 (1989). The Court also relied on
Zahn v. InternationalPaper Co., 414 U.S. 291 (1973). In Zahn, the Court refused to allow a
class action plaintiff in a diversity action, to append another jurisdictionally insufficient diversity action so as to meet the $10,000 amount in controversy requirement. Id. at 301-02.
The Court based its decision on the historically strict judicial construction of the diversity
statute which has been left undisturbed by Congress. Id. The Court also noted that congressional disapproval of the Court's interpretation would have manifested itself in either
amendments or official comments to the statute. Id. "[W]e find not a trace to this effect."
Id. at 302.
" Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 377 (1978). Congress has mandated that diversity jurisdiction is not available unless there is complete diversity. Id. at
374. Therefore, by implication, Congress has denied the use of pendent-party jurisdiction
when, as in this case, its exercise would allow assertion of diversity jurisdiction over nondiverse parties. Id. at 377. See Lykins v. Pointer Inc., 725 F.2d 645, 647-48 (11th Cir.
1984) (citing Owen, 437 U.S. at 373-74). ("Congress' consistent re-enactment and amendment of the diversity statute without altering the long-standing judicial interpretation that
the statute requires strict diversity, demonstrated a congressional mandate that diversity
jurisdiction is not to be available" to non-diverse parties, because congressional intent can-
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confer pendent-party jurisdiction over a state based claim against
a defendant county, reasoning that Congress exempted counties
from liability under the Civil Rights Act.77 However, Congress has
not expressed any such exemption under the FTCA. 78 Therefore,
it is submitted that by relying on Owen and Aldinger to determine
the outcome in Finley, the Court's analogy was both imprecise and
inadequate.
Upon finding no affirmative grant of jurisdiction, the Finley
Court simply denied its existence.7 9 Hence, the Supreme Court, in
overlooking the congressional intent behind the FTCA, did not
follow its own approach as set forth in Aldinger.8' Had the Court
done so, it would have found many indications that Congress did
not intend to negate jurisdiction over defendants other than the
United States. 8 ' The language of the FTCA indicates that Connot be circumvented by the use of pendent-party jurisdiction).
7
Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1, 19 (1976). In Aldinger, petitioner filed suit in federal
court pursuant to the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3). Id. at 4.
Petitioner then sought to append a state-law claim against a county onto her federal claim.
Id. In denying pendent-party jurisdiction, the Court first noted that the Civil Rights Act, as
then interpreted, excluded counties from liability. Id. at 16. Second, the Court noted that
congressional interpretation was predicated on the fact that the Civil Rights Act, as set out
in § 1983, is included in the jurisdictional grant of § 1343(3), and since counties are exempt from liability under § 1983, then by reference, Congress sought to exclude them also
under § 1343(3). Id. at 16-17. See Center Glass & Trim Co. v. United States, 637 F. Supp.
209, 211 (S.D. W. Va. 1986) (court emphasized that Congress intended that counties be
excluded from liability).
11 Dumansky v. United States, 486 F. Supp. 1078, 1088 (D.N.J. 1980). "Specifically, the
[Aldingerl Court held that since Congress had by implication negated the existence of federal jurisdiction over a municipal corporation in a claim brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §
1983, pendent party jurisdiction" could not be asserted. Id. "We are convinced that Congress has not expressly or impliedly negated the exercise of pendent-party jurisdiction
under the FTCA." Id. See also Lykins, 725 F.2d at 648 (as opposed to statutes involved in
Aldinger, '[n]o such indicia of a restrictive legislative intent toward pendent-party jurisdiction exists" under FTCA).
" Finley, 109 S. Ct. at 2008. justice Scalia, writing for the Court, formulated different
ways Congress could have written the FTCA to affirmatively grant the power to exercise
pendent-party jurisdiction. Id. (Justice Scalia suggested alternative formulations). Since the
suggested variations were not used, the majority concluded that Congress intended to negate pendent-party jurisdiction under the FTCA. Id. at 2008.
" See Finley, 109 S. Ct. at 2020 (Stevens, J., dissenting) Uustice Stevens commented that
Court was being unfaithful to its obligation to construe congressional intent when faced
with statute such as FTCA which is silent regarding exercise of pendent-party jurisdiction).
" See id. at 2017 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (exercise of pendent-party jurisdiction justified
since FTCA claims are within exclusive federal jurisdiction and Congress is silent); Stewart
v. United States, 716 F.2d 755, 758 (10th Cir. 1982) (since no congressional disapproval,
court reasoned that since jurisdiction is vested exclusively in federal courts, there was no
indication that Congress declined to extend federal jurisdiction to pendent-party, as in Aid-
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gress intended the United States to be treated as any private defendant in a similar tort suit.8" In most tort. claims involving joint
tortfeasors, it is common practice for plaintiffs to join all defendants that are faced with potential liability.8 3 Moreover, courts have
been inclined to construe the FTCA as indicating that all claims
against the United States should be adjudicated in one action.84 It
is submitted that the Finley Court not only ignored the second
part of its own two-tiered test, but also undermined part of the
congressional intent behind the FTCA. Moreover, other courts
will be bound to follow Finley, a decision based on a defective
analysis.
IV.

THE FEDERAL RULES AND PENDENT-PARTY JURISDICTION

In his dissent, Justice Stevens asserted the constitutionality of
invoking pendent-party jurisdiction over the petitioner's state
claims.8 5 Indeed, even the majority conceded that the constituinger), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1018 (1984). See also Lykins, 725 F.2d at 648 n.4. Primary
purpose of FTCA "isto avoid injustice to those having meritorious claims barred by sovereign immunity." (quoting United States v. Munoz, 374 U.S. 150, 154 (1963)). This goal
reflects a "congressional attitude sensitive to plaintiffs seeking recovery . . . in a single
lawsuit their claims for injuries suffered in a single accident." Id.
" See Maltais v. United States, 439 F. Supp. 540, 548 (N.D.N.Y. 1977) (FTCA intended
to make United States accountable for its torts without undue delay and in like manner as
private citizen). See also Dumansky, 486 F. Supp. at 1088 ("salient feature of the FTCA is
that 'the United States shall be liable . . . to the same extent as a private individual under
like circumstances.' ") (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1949)).
"' See Dumansky, 486 F. Supp. at 1088. "A private party sued in tort would expect the
plaintiff to join another party defendant if a common nucleus of operative facts subjected
both defendants to potential liability." Id.
'4 See id. The FTCA's grant of jurisdiction signals Congress' intent to determine the
monetary liability of the United States in a single action. Id. The jurisdictional grant includes power to adjudicate "any set-off, counterclaim, or other claim whatever on the part
of the United States against any plaintiff." Id. (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1346(c)). This is particularly meaningful in cases where the defendants file crossclaims against each other and the
United States' liability cannot be determined in a single action unless the non-federal
claims remain in the suit. Id. at 1088-89. See also Citizens Marine Nat'l Bank v. United
States Dep't of Commerce, 854 F.2d 223, 226 (7th Cir. 1988) (pendent-party claims allowed when arising from same nucleus of operative fact); Stewart v. United States, 716
F.2d 755, 758 (10th Cir. 1982) (allowed state claim pendent to FTCA claim). See generally
Brief for Petitioner at 28-35, Finley v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 2003 (1989) (No. 87-1973)
(due to fact that both state defendants filed indemnity actions against United States, no way
to determine, in a single action, the monetary liability of the United States unless pendentparty jurisdiction exercised).
"' Finley, 109 S. Ct. at 2012-13 (Stevens, J., dissenting). "Given the plain language of
article 111, there is not even an arguable basis for questioning the federal court's constitu-
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tional criteria for pendent-party jurisdiction, which is analogous to
the constitutional criteria for pendent claim jurisdiction, was met
by Finley's state law claims.86 However, absent express congressional authorization, the majority concluded that the requisite
strict reading of jurisdictional statutes8" precluded the conferral of
jurisdiction over the state claims by means of pendent-party
jurisdiction." s
To the contrary, as a matter of statutory interpretation, the
state claims against the utility and the city may be appended to the
FTCA claim against the United States with the assistance of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,8 9 and their traditional liberal
construction. The impleading of joint tortfeasors under Rule
tional power to decide it." Id.
86 Id. at 2007.
87 Id. "[We] will not read jurisdictional statutes broadly." Id. See supra notes 77-82 and
accompanying text. See also Currie, Pendent-Parties,45 U. CHI. L. REV. 753, 755-58 (1978)
(discusses Zahn v. InternationalPaper Co. in light of its strict statutory construction); Miller,
Ancillary and PendentJurisdiction, 26 S. TEX. L.J. 1, 9 (1985) (discussion of Owen and how
statutory limits of 28 U.S.C. section 1332(a)(1) have consistently been interpreted as requiring complete diversity).
8 Finley, 109 S. Ct. at 2008-09. The Court focuses on the specific jurisdictional statute,
the FTCA. Id. In line with Owen and Zahn, the majority strictly construed "against the
United States" to mean "against the United States and no one else." Id. at 2008. The
Court concludes that jurisdiction is defined in a manner which does not reach defendants
other than the United States. Id. at 2009.
8 See id. at 2013-16 (Stevens, J., dissenting). In interpreting the statute, the Court employed aids in construction to help define the words of the FTCA. Id. at 2009 n.6. See, e.g.,
United States v. American Trucking Ass'ns, 310 U.S. 534, 543-44 (1940) ("When aid to
construction of the meaning of words, as used in the statute, is available, there certainly
can be no 'rule of law' which forbids its use, however clear the words may appear on 'superficial examination.' ").
" See Finley, 109 S. Ct. at 2013-15 (Stevens, J., dissenting). "The relevant change that
was effectuated by the adoption of the Rules in 1938 was, in essence, a statutory broadening of the dimension of the cases that federal courts may entertain." Id. at 2014 (Stevens,
J., dissenting). "Under the Rules, the impulse is toward entertaining the broadest possible
scope of action consistent with fairness to the parties; joinder of claims, parties and remedies is strongly encouraged." United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 724 (1966). See
Comment, Federal Pendent, supra note 10, at 169 (spirit and purpose of Federal Rules permits more liberal joinder of parties); Comment, UMW v. Gibbs and Pendent Jurisdiction,
supra note 7, at 663 (support for broad joinder may be found by analogy to third-party
practice under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure); Note, supra note 3, at 212 (Federal Rules
contain liberal technical provisions for joinder). See also Goldberg, The Influence of Procedural Rules on FederalJurisdiction, 28 STAN. L. REV. 397 (1976). In response to an argument
similar to that presented in Finley majority, supra notes 40-42 and accompanying text,
Goldberg asserts that Rule 82 is mandated neither by the Constitution nor the Rules Enabling Act, but instead embodies a self-imposed policy. Id. at 432-43. Therefore it does not
preclude consideration of procedural changes in formulating tests for supplemental jurisdiction. Id. But see 13 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, supra note 1, § 3523 at 94
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14(a) and the assertion of additional claims against nonfederal defendants under Rule 20(a) are both applicable to the FTCA."1 In
addition, pendent-party jurisdiction finds "substantial analogues"
in the joinder of additional parties under the well-established doctrine of ancillary jurisdiction in relation to compulsory counterclaims under Rules 13(a)92 and 13(h). 93 As such, it is submitted
that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure enable the petitioner to
invoke pendent-party jurisdiction, and thus permit attachment of
state law claims to a federal claim, while defeating neither constitutional nor statutory power.
V.

RAMIFICATIONS OF REFUSING TO RECOGNIZE PENDENT-PARTY
JURISDICTION

Although the Finley Court determined that the Gibbs approach
would not be extended to the pendent-party field, 4 the Court in
Aldinger noted, in dicta, that certain statutes may allow the exercise of pendent-party jurisdiction.9 5 The Court specifically cited
the FTCA as an example since federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction over FTCA claims and it is the only forum that can hear
(Federal Rules did not broaden scope of supplemental jurisdiction, but just permitted
greater opportunities for its invocation); Comment, The Extension of Pendent Jurisdiction,
supra note 10, at 196-98 ("while the Federal Rules are liberal, they do not represent an
alternative means for getting a case into federal court"). Permitting pendent-party joinder
under the Federal Rules extends Rules beyond the bounds intended by its authors and is in
conflict with the purpose of the Rules: to establish uniformity, and bounds beyond which
jurisdiction may not extend. Id.
See Finley, 109 S. Ct. at 2013 (Stevens, J., dissenting)
" FED. R. Civ. P. 13(a). The rule, entitled "Compulsory Counterclaim," provides in pertinent part:
A pleading shall state as a counterclaim any claim which at the time of serving the
pleading the pleader has any opposing party, if it arises out of the transaction or
occurrence that is the subject matter of the opposing party's claim and does not
require for its adjudication the presence of third parties of whom the court cannot
acquire jurisdiction.
Id. (emphasis added).
" FED. R. Civ. P. 13(h). The rule, entitled "Joinder of Additional Parties," provides that
"[plersons other than those made parties to the original action may be made parties to a
counterclaim or cross-claim in accordance with Rules 19 and 20." Id. See Moor v. County
of Alameda, 411 U.S. 693, 714-15 (1972). In a case in which pendent-party jurisdiction was
deemed plausible but denied on discretionary concerns, the Court drew an analogy between pendent-party jurisdiction and counterclaims and crossclaims. Id.
" Finley, 109 S. Ct. at 2010.
" Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S.1, 18 (1976). "Other statutory grants and other alignments of parties and claims might call for a different result." Id.
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all related claims."' If pendent-party jurisdiction were denied
under the FTCA, plaintiffs would have to bring separate suits in
state and federal courts, thereby leading to duplicative adjudication of closely related claims. 9 7 In Finley, the petitioner would
have to prosecute the claim against the United States in federal
court and the claims against the city and the utility, involving precisely the same facts, "in a State court a block away." 98 This results in the imposition of unnecessary additional lawsuits on an already overburdened judicial system. 99 For example, in Finley, both
state defendants filed indemnity actions against the United
States; 0 what could have been resolved in a single lawsuit re" Aldinger, 427 U.S. at 18.

When the grant of jurisdiction to a federal court is exclusive, for example as in the
prosecution of tort claims against United States . . . the argument of judicial economy and convenience can be coupled with the additional argument that only in federal court may all of the claims be tried together.
Id. See Stewart v. United States, 715 F.2d 755, 758 (10th Cir. 1982), (citing Aldinger, 427
U.S. at 18) cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1018 (1984). The Stewart court noted that different considerations apply under the FTCA since the only way to hear all claims together is by
allowing pendent-party jurisdiction. Id.
The Aldinger Court did not espouse a broader holding, encompassing the dicta therein,
not because it did not firmly believe it was correct, but to remain loyal to the judicial policy
of incrementalism as it has so often done, and thereby rule solely on the facts before them.
See Blake v. Arnett, 663 F.2d 906, 910 (9th Cir. 1981).
'" See United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966) (pendent jurisdiction
permits both state and federal claims to comprise one case); Astor-Honor, Inc. v. Grosset &
Dunlap, 441 F.2d 622, 629 (2d Cir. 1971) (multiple suits create unjustifiable waste ofjudicial and professional time); Fortune, Pendent Jurisdiction- The Problem of "Pendenting Parties", 34 U. Pirr. L. REV. 1, 8-9 (1972) (discussion of negative impacts resulting from denial
of exercise of pendent jurisdiction over related state claims). An argument of economy and
convenience to litigants can be used in conjunction with the fact that the FTCA grants
exclusive jurisdiction to the federal courts, to produce a compelling situation for the exercise of pendent-party jurisdiction. Aldinger, 427 U.S. at 18. This causes duplicative litigation no matter how expensive, wasteful and needless. Id. See also Connecticut Gen. Life Ins.
Co. v. Craton, 405 F.2d 41, 48 (5th Cir. 1968). "Given the amount of time and energy
already expended . . . the strong and practical policies undergirding the pendent jurisdiction doctrine" support the exercise of pendent party jurisdiction. Id.
9' Guarantee Trust Co. of N.Y. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 109 (1945) (quoted in AstorHonor, Inc. v. Grosset & Dunlap, 441 F.2d 627, 630 (2d Cir. 1971) (language here is figurative so as to demonstrate how ludicrous it is to force case to be divided up between separate buildings).
99 Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1965). The problem of the overburdened judicial
system
was one of the reasons for the creation of the pendent jurisdiction doctrine. See id. See
generally Howard, Our Litigious Society, 38 S.C.L. REV. 365 (1987) (discussion of increase in
law suits and the possible remedies available).
' Brief for Petitioner at 4 n.2, Finley v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 2003 (1989) (No. 871973). Both state defendants, the city and the utility, filed indemnity suits against the
United States. Id.
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quired the adjudication of four separate suits."' Clearly, one of
the reasons for the exercise of pendent jurisdiction is to promote
judicial economy." 2 However, it is submitted that by not allowing
the exercise of pendent-party jurisdiction the Finley decision will
only serve to curtail the judicial economy which the Gibbs Court
sought to promote.
In addition, when a claimant must bring separate actions in
state and federal court he will be faced with bearing the costs of
both lawsuits.' Indigent plaintiffs, therefore, may have to make a
choice between equally meritorious claims, thereby foregoing
their rightful day in court. " Forcing plaintiffs to separate actions
also imposes upon the parties the risk of being subject to conflicting findings of fact and conclusions of law.' Further, defendants
in separate suits may seek to cast blame on each other, and it
would be possible for the plaintiff to recover nothing.0 6 It is submitted that the Finley decision will only serve to diminish the importance of judicial economy, convenience and fairness to litigants, which were the compelling reasons for the creation of the
federal pendent jurisdiction doctrine.
01 Id. Since the United States can only be sued in federal court, both state defendants
must bring their indemnity suits in federal forums. Id. In addition to the two indemnity
actions, there were the petitioner's state and federal actions. Id.
01 Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 726. The Court noted that judicial economy was one of the reasons for the creation of pendent jurisdiction. Id. See Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co. v.
Craton, 405 F.2d 41, 48 (5th Cir. 1968) (due to amount of needless duplication of judicial
time and energy separate suits would entail, court exercised pendent-party jurisdiction).
103 See generally Freer, A Principled Statutory Approach to Supplemental Jurisdiction, 1987
DUKE L.J. 34, 74-75 (impact on claimants who assert pendent-party jurisdiction); Note,
supra note 7, at 905-07 (discussion of evils to be borne by plaintiffs forced to bring separate
actions).
104 See Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S.
1, 36 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (claimant
penalized due to denial of pendent-party jurisdiction in matters exclusive to federal forum).
See also Note, supra note 59, at 384 (avers that indefensible choice will be applied to all
cases).
10' See Note, supra note 7, at 905-07. "The trial of all related claims in one forum eliminates needless repetition of efforts by courts and parties; it also reduces the possibility of
conflicting findings of law and fact." Id. at 906.
204 See Hipp v. United States, 313 F. Supp. 1152, 1155 (E.D.N.Y. 1970). "The case of a
joint tortfeasor made a defendant under the FTCA is peculiarly appropriate" for the exercise of pendent-party jurisdiction because "if cases are tried separately, each defendant
would seek to cast blame on the other and it would be possible for the plaintiff to recover
nothing." Id.
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CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court in Finley set forth an unnecessarily narrow
holding. In contrast, the rules suggested in the dissents are more
reasonable since they would permit courts to recognize pendentparty jurisdiction in certain circumstances. Under the Gibbs analysis, a court would still be able to refuse its exercise as a matter of
discretion. Also, by ignoring congressional intent, the Supreme
Court failed to recognize that the intent behind the FTCA was to
have the United States treated as any other private defendant,
and to have all claims against the United States resolved in one
action. Further, the Court's decision requires the plaintiff to bring
separate suits in state and federal court, which runs contrary to
the aims of judicial economy, convenience and fairness to litigants.
Finally, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in an effort to clarify the confusion that had existed in the federal courts on the issue of pendent-party jurisdiction under the FTCA. However, because the Supreme Court deviated from its normal mode of
analysis in determining whether pendent-party jurisdiction exists
under congressional statutes, the Finley decision provides little
guidance to federal courts faced with the same determinations
under different statutes.
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